T 'he Social Market Economy
(Soziale Marktwirtschaft) is the model of the economic order in the Federal Republic of Germany. A precise definition of this concept is difficult. ML~ller-Armack, who coined the term, once described "social market economy" as a "progressive style concept yet to be elaborated ''1. This description implies that the content of the concept is liable to change as it is being applied to ever new conditions which are seen to be in need of being put in order.
It is not far-fetched to consider the application of this style concept to an area of external economic relations which is currently thought to be in special need of being put in order, namely, the economic relations between the industrialized and the developing countries. The debate about a so-called New International Economic Order is focusing on them 2. The developing countries are the active party in this debate; the industrialized countries play a largely passive role.
The developing countries are postulating demands which, though often contradictory, evidence their intention to substitute methods of a planned economy for the rules of a market economy in the international division of labour. The reaction of the industrialized countries has been in the main to adopt a "defensivepragmatic" attitude3: Defensive it is insofar as it is their * Frankfurt University/Trenton State College, Trenton, N. J., USA.-Prof. Sautter's article is based on preparatory work for a paper which he read at the annual meeting of Deutsche Gesellschaft f~r Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften (Verein fer Socialpolitik) in Nuremberg on Sept. 17, 1980. 276 main concern to ward off attacks on the market economy order; and it is pragmatic insofar as the industrialized countries are on political grounds quite willing to give way on some aspects of the economic order. So far they have failed to set forth a concept of their own which would enable them to respond to justified demands of the developing countries.
Lack of a Viable Order
This is the starting point for a consideration of the style concept of a Social Market Economy in the context of the North-South relations. If we are convinced that the desirable order in a domestic economy is not a "free" but a "social" market economy, there should be no objection in principle to the application of this tenet to the economic relations between industrialized and developing countries. It might help to soften the hardened fronts in the NorthSouth dialogue if the present international economic order were elaborated in this way. However, before discussing this question it is useful to pinpoint a few of the problems which have caused the developing countries to press for a new order for the world economy. These problems manifest the absence of a viable order in many areas of international economic relations at the present time: it is not so much a matter of replacing an existing order by a new one as of making good a deficiency.
This deficiency has arisen because, put briefly, agreed international rules have been devalued in the course of time and because there are important areas in international economic relations in which internationally recognized rules do not exist at all. A few illustrations will make this clear.
Shortcomings of GA'n"
GATT and the Bretton Woods agreement are the dual basis of the existing economic world order. Both owe their origin to arrangements between the major industrialized countries in the mid-forties. GATT was designed as a means of removing tariff and non-tariff obstacles to trade and thus to contribute to the reintegration of the international economy according to the principle underlying the market economy. The basic idea was to outlaw all obstacles to trade other than tariffs and to lower the tariffs step by step while observing the principle of reciprocity. Treaty violations were to be punished by loss of treaty rights. Primary and industrial goods were to be accorded the same treatment in principle.
In reality however the agreement was confined mainly to the trade in industrial goods. No serious efforts were made to liberalize the trade in agricultural produce. This may be ascribed in part to the interest of the trading countries in safeguarding their food supplies and not depending on imports. In great measure however this policy must be attributed to the wish to keep the local farmers' incomes on a relatively high level. Price policy measures were used to this end, especially in the European countries. Protectionist devices became indispensable to screen this policy from the outside world. Faced with a conflict between adherence to international rules and pursuit of domestic economic objectives the industrialized countries thus gave preference to their domestic objectives. In a large area of international trade the GATT rules were thus in actual fact invalidated.
The protective measures of the industrialized countries in favour of what were called "structurally weak industries" (e. g. the textile, shoe and steel industries) had a similar effect. It is of the essence of INTERECONOMICS, November/December 1980 the market-economy concept that local industries can be subjected to increasing competitive pressure by foreign suppliers enjoying comparative cost advantages in the production of a certain article. There is in this case an inescapable need for reallocation of production factors. It emerged however that important industrialized countries were not willing to accept this consequence of the principle of the market economy. They parried the competitive pressure of low-cost suppliers by making extensive use of the escape clause of Art. 19 GATT and circumventing GATT by so-called "voluntary export restraints". This also tended to devalue the normative force of the GATT regulations 4.
Similarly, the arrangements on the regulation of international payments lost their normative importance in the course of time. The international monetary agreement of Bretton Woods had assigned to the USA the role of key-currency country. The creation of international liquidity depended therefore in great measure on the monetary policy of one country. In view of the dollar scarcity in the post-war era there seemed to be no reason to take precautions against an overextension of international liquidity. Subsequently this turned out to be a significant weakness of the Bretton Woods agreement. For understandable internal reasons the USA was unwilling to keep faith with its international responsibility as key-currency country by observing a stricter monetary discipline, and this led eventually to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.
Gaps in the International Rule-Book
The course of events in the past three decades has not only devalued many of the rules for international economic relations agreed after the war but revealed the existence of gaps in the system of rules. The process of political decolonization had a special impact in this respect. The interests of the developing countries can no longer be ignored as in the midforties. To give an example, the developing countries are insisting on special arrangements for the international trade in raw materials because their exports still consist largely of primary commodities. Such provisions had orginally been envisaged in the Havana Charter'but were not incorporated in GATT. Successful attempts to get better terms for participation in the world trade were made by the oil- 
